



V. SOCIAL TRANSITION

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V.1. OVERVIEW

Demographic changes, digitalisation and technological transformations, climate change, and globalisation have profound implications for modern societies.

Societal transformations – such as incremental changes to our institutions, values, rules and lifestyles – have always contributed to the evolution of European societies by complementing or responding to political, economic or technological changes. More recently, however, Europe acknowledged the need to harness the potential of these transformations to address how radical changes, such as the Digital and Green twin transitions, affect its citizens, its economy and its environment.

The twin transitions often create new living and working conditions, such as changes in skills requirements, business models, or employment terms and conditions, which in turn affect citizens' incomes, well-being and health. A successful Social transition can mobilise collective resources and support societal and individual well-being and welfare by ensuring that common values and fundamental rights, like gender equality, social inclusion, fair income and poverty reduction, are not neglected. This is even more important now, since the COVID-19 pandemic has greatly affected many aspects of social life and challenged social cohesion and resilience.

Policy at the EU level supports Member States, businesses, social partners and citizens towards achieving higher levels of sustainable production, while reaching the employment, skills and poverty reduction targets proposed by the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan and endorsed by the Porto Social Summit of May 2021⁴⁷.

Within this context, the role of the TPI is to follow the progress towards these societal goals and promote the debate over the most effective and efficient means to achieve them, so that no citizen is left behind⁴⁸. As explained in the conceptual framework, the lean choice of TPI indicators for the Social transition provides a snapshot of key features: Health, Work and inclusion (with a gender dimension), Free or non-remunerated time and Equality (reflected by a balanced income distribution). A more detailed explanation of the conceptual framework and the selected indicators is included in Appendices I and III, respectively.

Transition leaders and strong performers in Social transition

The fact that 24 countries, as well as the EU-27, are transition leaders in three or more sub-pillars highlights that progress in Social transition is a realistic objective, and an issue of policy priorities (**TABLE 11**). Leader positions by several countries in the second half of the ranking corroborates this assessment.

All EU-27 countries are transition leaders or strong transition performers.

Iceland is the top performer in the Social transition as well as in the sub-pillar Free or non-remunerated time. Japan dominates the sub-pillar Health, New Zealand in the Work and inclusion one, and Slovenia in the Equality sub-pillar.

Among the 27 leaders in the Social transition, 12 achieve leader positions in all four sub-pillars, 15 countries have a less-than-strong performance in one sub-pillar (notably Luxembourg, New Zealand and the United Kingdom with a merely good performance in Equality). Within this upper group, room for progress is the greatest in the Equality indicator.

⁴⁷ These ambitious EU targets are: at least 78% of the population aged 20 to 64 in employment; at least 60% of all adults participating in training every year; and a reduction of at least 15 million in the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion.

⁴⁸ European Commission, Communication on [Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021](#), COM/2020/575 final.



In the group of strong transition performers, the situation is also rather satisfactory, with no country in moderate or weak transition in any of the sub-pillars, except for Armenia in Work and inclusion, Moldova in Work and inclusion and in Free or non-remunerated time, and Israel and Bulgaria in Equality. All countries in that group achieve leadership in at least one sub-pillar, except for Romania.

Good performers in Social transition

The group of good performers in the Social transition (16 countries as well as the world average) presents a more dispersed performance across the four sub-pillars; the TPI may therefore be useful mainly in drawing attention to the potential risks of imbalances.

Five countries in this group manage to be transition leaders in one sub-pillar. However, six countries have a weak transition performance in at least one sub-pillar, most commonly in Work and inclusion.

Singapore, Algeria, Kenya and Argentina show both leader and weak positions, a demonstration of imbalance.

Moderate and weak performers in Social transition

Ten countries are moderate or weak performers in the Social transition. Colombia and Turkey are transition leaders in Health while Egypt is transition leader in Equality. Brazil is strong in two sub-pillars, Health and Free or non-remunerated time, but the country shows a weak performance in Equality, demonstrating an imbalanced transition performance. This is also the case for Iran, with scores ranging from 17.4 in Work and inclusion to 70.9 in Health. Nigeria, India and South-Africa have moderate or weak transition performances in Health, which is the sub-pillar with the best scores. South-Africa shows an exceptionally weak score in Equality, with 4.6.

V.2. SOCIAL TRANSITION, PROGRESS OVER 2011-2020

In terms of performance and progress over the past decade in Social transition, **TABLE 11** highlights that:

- Progress has been relatively balanced across groups of countries. Transition leaders and strong performers progressed on average by 4.9%, good performers by 7.1 %, whereas moderate and weak performers progressed by 5.1 %. Within these groups there are, of course, countries progressing and countries regressing.
- On average, the 72 countries progressed by 4.7 % (vs 4.4% in the EU-27) over the last decade, in line with the progress achieved in the composite TPI.
- China, Malta, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates all show material progress in the societal transition (above 10%).
- There is also a more moderate but clear progress in several countries, which improved their performances during the last 10 years. For instance, eight countries (as well as the EU-27 as a whole) became leaders and four countries became strong performers, while eight other countries managed to improve from moderate to good transition performers.
- On the other hand, Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Ukraine and the United States all show declining scores over the decade.
- Among the 10 countries with moderate or weak scores, there are four countries with declining TPI scores over the last decade, notably Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco and Iran.

As there is no clear pattern of progress in the Social transition in terms of base levels (2011) or income levels, explanations for diverging paths may derive from more detailed analyses of country profiles.



TABLE 11: Social transition pillar ranking

RANK	COUNTRY	PROGRESS	2020 SCORES				
			SOCIAL TRANSITION	Health	Work & inclusion	Free or non-remunerated time	Equality
1	Iceland	3.0%	89.7	89.9	86.5	94.3	88.9
2	Slovenia	6.0%	85.9	85.8	80.2	80.2	92.3
3	Norway	-1.3%	85.8	87.9	85.5	87.1	83.9
4	Denmark	2.4%	85.5	86.8	84.2	87.8	84.1
5	Netherlands	2.0%	84.8	88.1	81.8	86.8	83.1
6	Sweden	-0.3%	84.3	89.7	87.4	88.7	76.1
7	Finland	4.6%	84.1	86.7	80.5	81.8	85.6
8	Czechia	7.8%	83.9	79.3	81.9	78.2	91.7
9	Switzerland	2.0%	82.9	91.7	87.1	89.7	70.4
10	Germany	1.0%	82.0	86.3	85.3	89.8	72.7
11	Belgium	5.2%	81.6	85.2	77.9	75.4	84.6
12	Japan	6.7%	81.4	97.0	77.7	83.3	71.3
13	France	4.4%	81.0	90.3	80.3	83.8	73.1
14	Slovakia	8.3%	80.9	78.5	76.5	76.2	87.9
15	Austria	3.6%	80.6	86.5	81.8	81.3	75.4
16	Malta	13.1%	80.1	88.2	77.7	70.6	81.1
17	Estonia	9.7%	79.2	80.8	80.5	80.1	76.9
18	Cyprus	3.7%	79.2	91.4	74.8	77.5	73.8
19	Ireland	5.5%	78.3	86.9	76.8	73.2	76.0
20	New Zealand	2.9%	78.0	84.1	89.1	82.0	64.9
21	Australia	3.2%	77.9	86.4	82.7	80.1	67.9
	EU-27	4.4%	77.5	85.7	77.3	77.8	71.6
22	Canada	1.5%	77.1	87.5	75.5	80.4	68.8
23	United Kingdom	2.9%	77.1	83.8	83.4	83.7	64.8
24	Portugal	8.1%	76.9	86.5	78.6	76.4	69.4
25	Luxembourg	0.2%	75.5	88.5	77.0	78.3	63.7
26	South Korea	6.0%	75.4	93.5	69.2	63.0	73.2
27	Hungary	8.1%	75.3	74.0	72.7	74.0	78.4
28	Spain	4.0%	74.7	90.3	71.7	77.7	63.6
29	Poland	10.9%	74.1	78.9	72.5	63.8	77.4
30	United Arab Emirates	12.3%	73.9	70.0	68.7	60.5	87.5
31	Israel	7.0%	72.7	91.3	84.3	72.2	53.0
32	Latvia	8.8%	72.2	70.8	81.2	76.8	65.5
33	Croatia	9.6%	72.0	78.7	64.8	61.9	77.0
34	Lithuania	4.1%	71.7	72.3	79.7	78.1	63.2
35	Thailand	3.6%	71.1	77.5	73.8	65.9	68.0
36	Vietnam	2.5%	71.0	67.7	82.4	76.8	63.5
37	Greece	7.2%	70.9	86.2	59.1	65.5	69.8
38	Ukraine	-3.8%	70.5	64.3	58.7	59.3	88.1
39	Albania	-3.7%	70.2	80.3	65.7	62.3	70.2
40	Italy	2.7%	70.2	89.7	65.1	66.8	61.0
41	China	13.3%	68.2	78.4	79.6	61.7	58.2
42	Russia	11.7%	66.8	64.0	76.0	69.8	61.8
43	Armenia	-3.1%	66.2	73.7	40.9	57.0	80.4
44	Romania	5.9%	66.0	72.8	69.6	65.4	59.3
45	Moldova	13.7%	65.8	65.1	52.0	37.1	90.5
46	Bulgaria	-1.2%	65.3	70.9	72.8	75.9	51.1
47	Serbia	16.1%	63.4	72.9	61.0	63.2	58.0
48	United States	-1.2%	62.5	70.4	66.8	71.3	49.3
49	Chile	6.5%	62.0	83.5	57.4	67.3	46.2
50	Singapore	5.7%	62.0	95.2	54.2	65.2	40.8
51	Georgia	4.1%	61.8	65.6	47.4	68.6	63.5
52	North Macedonia	18.4%	61.7	70.5	46.1	58.4	66.1
53	Malaysia	12.1%	61.6	68.9	70.7	60.5	51.7
54	Indonesia	8.6%	60.6	59.4	56.5	67.2	60.0
55	Montenegro	11.8%	60.0	73.2	55.3	58.1	54.2
56	Algeria	3.0%	59.6	71.3	26.9	32.6	85.5
	World	4.7%	59.4	67.2	49.5	58.6	60.0
57	Kenya	8.4%	58.5	42.3	68.7	77.4	53.5
58	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.2%	58.0	74.0	27.5	46.5	70.5
59	Argentina	4.9%	57.9	73.8	39.8	78.1	45.3
60	Mexico	3.7%	55.9	69.2	49.0	68.3	43.3
61	Tunisia	4.9%	55.7	73.0	22.1	39.8	71.8
62	Philippines	5.9%	55.1	56.7	58.4	57.0	51.0
63	Colombia	8.1%	54.9	79.9	52.7	72.8	28.1
64	Turkey	5.7%	53.5	78.0	27.8	56.5	49.1
65	Egypt	-4.5%	50.7	59.9	9.9	32.8	77.7
66	Nigeria	-7.8%	48.3	31.3	39.4	47.7	65.8
67	Brazil	2.5%	48.3	68.0	49.6	66.8	22.8
68	India	2.5%	47.7	51.1	16.2	39.8	67.9
69	Morocco	1.1%	47.5	62.3	25.1	34.5	57.2
70	Iran	-0.8%	44.9	70.9	17.4	30.6	50.2
71	Saudi Arabia	10.3%	39.8	63.4	19.1	44.9	31.8
72	South Africa	33.5%	30.0	37.2	43.3	52.4	4.6

■ Transition leader [75-100] ■ Strong transition [65-75] ■ Good transition [55-65] ■ Moderate transition [45-55] ■ Weak transition [0-45]

Notes: 'Progress 2011-20' refers to the percentage growth of economic transition scores from 2011 to 2020.

Source: European Commission, Transitions Performance Index 2021.



V.3. TPI AND EQUALITY

Evolution of inequalities


The evolution of inequalities is an important factor affecting well-being. Economic and Environmental transitions may result in positive societal and environmental effects. However, they also present significant risks which, if not sufficiently anticipated and accompanied by public interventions, may affect the poorest and most vulnerable. The emergence of new threats, such as pandemics, increases the need to pay special attention to variables estimating inequality. There are already indications that the COVID-19 crisis has worsened inequalities and increased poverty in some countries.

The Equality sub-pillar is central to the TPI and after consultation with experts and stakeholders is measured by combining two indicators:

- The Gini coefficient, which is an objective measure of the dispersion of income in a population. Mathematically there cannot be a more comprehensive measure of income inequality. The indicator was retained after taxes and social transfers, so that countries with effective income redistribution policies are recognised.
- The share of revenues received by the poorest 20% of the population⁴⁹.

FIGURE 12 compares the degree to which some countries' scores have evolved along this sub-pillar over time. The EU-27 shows stability, Japan shows a declining pattern, while China is catching up and overtaking a stagnating United States, with Russia showing steady, incremental progress. In terms of levels, **FIGURE 11** illustrates that the EU-27 and Japan are well above China or Russia, and even more so, the United States.

FIGURE 11: TPI Equality sub-pillar scores



Source: European Commission, Transitions Performance Index 2021.

⁴⁹ The situation of the poorest population is already integrated in the Gini coefficient. The addition of this sub-pillar reinforces the need for an additional effort for this social group.



The evolution of equality is the result of policy choices and not predetermined by any of the TPI's variables. The evolution of the top five is particularly positive, except for Ukraine (-4.6%) due to the impact of war.

As for the degree to which equality in the EU-27 has evolved, the TPI's equality indicator remains quite stable after a deterioration from 2011 to 2016 (**FIGURE 11**)⁵⁰.

An open issue: Interactions between TPI performance and inequalities

Of course, as the equality indicator is part of the TPI, there is by construction a statistical link. However, equality is only one indicator among 28, so this element does not exclude a more general reflection on the relation between inequalities and the TPI as a different approach to measure prosperity.

The question examined here is whether progress in policy areas measured by other TPI indicators significantly facilitates progress in equality, similar to a feedback loop.

The answer seems to be negative. The correlation between the TPI Equality sub-pillar and other TPI indicators was examined and none of the elements taken in isolation has a marked correlation with equality. On the other hand, the composite TPI itself has a net positive correlation of 0.69 with equality in 2020, which is lower than with other sub-pillars in the Social transition.

V.4. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE SOCIAL TRANSITION

The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly affected people around the globe. Not only the pandemic has had a direct impact on citizens' health, but also on their access to work and therefore on their income. It has also highlighted the need for new skills, in particular digital skills.

As most schools have been partly closed during that period, the crisis has also put an additional burden on women.

Finally, the crisis has also brought forward the disparities between countries, and even inside countries, as different measures were taken, not only to contain the COVID-19 pandemic but also to mitigate the effects of partial unemployment.

The impact of COVID-19 is not fully captured in this edition of the TPI because of delays in data transmission for aggregate indicators.

Health


The indicator 'Healthy life expectancy at birth (years)' from WHO was last updated in December 2020 and the last data available is from 2019. So far, only the United States has a declining healthy life expectancy from 2011 to 2019, notably due to the opioid crisis. According to WHO, the increase in healthy life expectancy from 2011 to 2019 at the global level has not kept pace with the increase in life expectancy, meaning that the increase in healthy life expectancy is more due to declining mortality rather than reduced years with disability.⁵¹

The data included in the TPI does not yet take into account the impact of COVID-19 on healthy life expectancy. At the time of the drafting, more than five million deaths due to COVID-19 were officially registered. In many countries, a major part of the official number of deaths due to COVID-19 occurred in 2021. If the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic affected mostly elderly people, then the average age of death may have decreased with subsequent waves.

⁵⁰ The financial crisis (2008-2010), banking crisis (2010-2012) and sovereign debt crisis (mainly 2010-2014) may have had an impact, but the linkages are not assessed here.

⁵¹ WHO, '[GHE: Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy](#)'.

FIGURE 12: Equality sub-pillar score and progress over 2011-2020



Source: European Commission, Transitions Performance Index 2021.



In 2020, life expectancy at birth fell in the vast majority of the EU-27 Member States with available 2020 data⁵². It is therefore probable that healthy life expectancy would decrease over the next years when the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is reflected.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has had major consequences on the organisation of health systems in many countries, delaying many medical operations and raising fears about the future burden of undiagnosed diseases.

The COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated some already existing trends in public health.

For instance, changes in lifestyle (more stress, less physical activities, unhealthy diet) were already a major public health issue before the COVID-19 pandemic. There is also evidence that overweight and obesity risks, which are major comorbidity factor risks for COVID-19, have increased during the pandemic, accompanied by a lack of physical activities enhanced by partially closures of sport facilities. Before the pandemic, the World Health Organization had already estimated that this issue has 'grown to epidemic proportions, with over 4 million people dying each year as a result of being overweight or obese in 2017 according to the global burden of disease'⁵³.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a huge impact on mental health, notably on students, which may negatively impact learning outcomes in the coming years, as well as their well-being. The future well-being and productivity of adults may also be affected by the ongoing pandemic.

Finally, environmental factors, such as air, water and environmental pollution affect healthy life. For instance, according to the World Health Organization, 4.2 million deaths occur every year as the result of exposure to ambient air pollution⁵⁴.

Therefore, although healthy life expectancy has kept increasing (except in the United States) and considering the different risks described above, it is legitimate to wonder if the healthy life expectancy will flatten.

Work and inclusion

During the past 10 years, the share of those employed in the age bracket 20-64 has increased in the EU-27, from 67.9% to 72.5% in aggregate. A more modest growth can be noticed for the 19 countries participating in the Euro area. It is worth pointing out that the employment share of this age group increased not only in aggregate terms but also in every individual EU-27 Member State, probably as a rebound from the economic and sovereign debt crises, which affected the EU-27 between 2007 and 2012.

However, this trend came to a halt in 2020, as all EU-27 Member States (with the notable exceptions of Croatia and Poland) saw a reduction in this indicator, most likely due to the impact of COVID-19 in employment. Re-skilling and upskilling of workers who lost their jobs or work in sectors undergoing a digital/green transformation may be necessary, in order to prevent further job losses in the medium or long term.

FIGURE 13 shows the comparison between the sub-pillar Work and inclusion and the European Skills Index⁵⁵. The positive association suggests that a strong skills framework impacts positively on work and inclusion. However, achievements in both indices vary considerably by member state. Sweden outperforms in both dimensions. With similar and relatively low scores in the European Skills Index, Spain considerably outperforms Greece in work and inclusion. In turn, with similar scores in work and inclusion, Denmark and Germany shows better performances in Work and inclusion than Malta or Poland. While Czechia shows the best performance in the European Skills Index, four countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden and United Kingdom) outperform its score in Work and inclusion.

52 Eurostat, '*Life expectancy decreased in 2020 across the EU*'


53 WHO, '*Obesity*'

54 WHO, '*Air pollution*'

55 European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), '*European Skills Index*,



FIGURE 13: European Skills Index and TPI's Work and inclusion sub-pillar scores



Source: European Commission, Transitions Performance Index 2021.



While increased participation in the labour market is important in achieving or maintaining an inclusive society, potential gender differences show how equitable this increase is.

Over the past decade, the gender gap in the employment-to-population ratio has decreased from 14.6% to 13.7% in the EU-27, suggesting a slow movement towards a more equal participation of women in the EU's labour market. The indicator is not weighted for individual country populations, and data for the most populous EU-27 Member States show that the gender gap improved in four out of five of them (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), with Poland being the only one marking an increase. Overall, 17 countries saw their gender gaps improve (the best performers being Luxembourg and Malta), while in 10 others there was a widening in the gap between men and women.

The lack of available data for 2020 makes it impossible to trace a potential COVID-19 impact on the gender gap in the current edition of the TPI. However, other measurable factors such as the division of labour in childcare due to the increased rate of home-schooling provide a warning about a potential reversal of the progress made on this front before the pandemic⁵⁶.

If this trend continues after the pandemic, the pattern of increasing enrolment rates⁵⁷ in early childhood education and care services in the EU-27, which was observed in the past decade, could contribute to an increased participation of women in the labour market. However, a combination of public interventions will be needed to ensure employers and education institutions can use both traditional and digital solutions in a flexible way, which facilitates equitable access to education and employment for children and parents, respectively.

In addition, the pandemic highlighted the need for skills adaptation (reskilling and upskilling) in the context of digitalisation and the Green transition. Education and skills are a strong determinant for social inclusion. Besides, the current labour shortage in some sectors could put on hold the recovery.

In most countries where 2020 data are fully available for that sub-pillar, the score decreased between 2019 and 2020.

Finally, the available data does not consider partial unemployment, which increased massively due to measures put in place in place massively in many countries

Equality

Developments in income inequality could shed some light on the initial impact COVID-19 had on the global economy, which was already under digital and green transformations. During the biggest part of 2020, the world witnessed a slowing down in social and economic activity due to lockdowns, an acceleration in the adoption of digital technologies in commerce, government and the workplace, as well as a reduction in some emission- and pollution-generating activities.

While the effects of such changes were sizeable, the 10-year Equality sub-pillar does not project a similar 'break' in data from 2019 to 2020, probably due to delays in data collection and lags in transmission to aggregate indicators.

The academic and policy debate around this question has provided mixed results so far. Early evidence suggested that the pandemic decreased unweighted income inequality among countries⁵⁸.

56 European Commission, '*Focus on: Is home-schooling during the pandemic exacerbating gender inequalities?*', 14 December 2020.

57 UNESCO, '*Early childhood care and education*'.

58 When weighted for population though, China's continued growth and India's contraction further complicated the picture. See Deaton, A., '*Covid-19 and global income inequality*', National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021



Alternative opinions highlighted the importance of factors other than income so as to have a complete picture on global inequalities or pointed out that important changes happening now might have long-lasting negative effects on equality globally. Such alternative approaches focus on factors such as the deterioration of access to education and living standards⁵⁹, limited access to health care⁶⁰, or pre-existing inequalities affecting women and minorities⁶¹.

As far as within-country inequality is concerned, some studies show that, in some high-income countries, government responses (e.g. direct payments to households, partial unemployment guarantees, and exceptional relief measures etc.) tempered the impact of the crisis on low-income households and on inequalities. However, available data also shows that high-income households were able to accumulate more wealth⁶². In addition, the World Inequalities Report highlights that ‘the large stimulus packages implemented by rich countries were both essential and successful in preventing a sharp rise in poverty and inequality at the bottom of the distribution. It should be noted, however, that these programs were costly and increased public debt by the order of 5–20% of national income’. Choices over the size, modalities and timeline for debt repayment may also have an impact on inequalities within and among countries.

As evidence keeps coming in⁶³, this debate may inform future versions of the TPI sub-pillar Equality, to capture such movements, if they emerge.

V.5. LINKAGE BETWEEN SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITIONS

The social dimension is at the heart of the EU’s ambitious green agenda. The Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, part of the 2022 European Semester Autumn package published on 24 November 2021, highlights that ‘Europe’s economic, social and environmental policy agenda should ensure that governments at all levels, businesses, social partners and households, contribute consistently towards reaching the EU targets for the Green and Digital transitions, as well as the employment, skills and poverty reduction targets set with the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’.

Social and environmental policies are joint ambitions aimed at ensuring a socially fair Green transition.

In regard to climate change, the Green transition will create massive opportunities for mitigation and adaptation, in particular in terms of job creation. Significant investments will be needed to accompany the necessary labour market transitions and support reskilling and upskilling, both pre-conditions for a just and effective transition.

In addition, changes triggered by the Green transition may affect the most disadvantaged and vulnerable communities, as well as some regions and sectors.

59 UNDP, *COVID-19 and Human Development: Assessing the Crisis, Envisioning the Recovery*, New York, 2020.

60 Stiglitz, J., ‘*Conquering the Great Divide*’, Finance & Development, Fall 2020, IMF, Washington, DC.

61 Ferreira, F. H. G., ‘*Inequality in the time of COVID-19*’, Finance & Development, Summer 2021, IMF, Washington, DC.

62 Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G. et al., *World Inequality Report 2022*, World Inequality Lab. 2021.

63 See for example how the rising share of population in extreme poverty may be affecting more the LAC, MENA and SSA regions: World Bank Blogs, ‘*Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty: Turning the corner on the pandemic in 2021?*’, June 2021

In turn, five countries, none in the EU-27, progressed socially while declining in the environmental dimension (purple lines): Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Georgia and Singapore.

Only two countries declined in both dimensions over the past decade: Iran and Nigeria.

The figure highlights different dynamics for countries, both in terms of progress (line length), direction of the transition (colour and/or steepness showing progress in the Environmental transition and flatness showing progress in the Social transition). For instance, Croatia and Latvia are in 2020 very close on both dimensions, coming from different positions in 2011.